Beating the Battle Drums
On St. Bartholomew’s Day the BBC broadcast a radio drama
under the title A Dog in the Fight, written by Hugh Costello and produced by
Eoin O’Callaghan (Big Fish Media). Perhaps a reader in Ireland could tell us
whether it has also appeared on RTÉ; but even if it has not it will have been
available to analogue listeners in the eastern counties and to all listeners
anywhere in Ulster and also in Louth.
Like many of
Mr. O’Callaghan’s productions it had an informative and cleverly written script
replete with political ambiguity concerning the subject at issue such that it
would be entirely possible for either the writer or the production company to
deny having taken any position on the relevant questions. Nevertheless drama is drama, and the veil of
fiction does not so much conceal as reduce that which it covers to outlines and
contrasts. The position promoted was, of
course, that taken by the character presented as the most reasonable and
likeable, i.e. in this case the wife.
The story
concerns a Dublin couple who had moved to the country to give their troubled
marriage a fresh start. A Russian drone
is shot down in their garden; and a civil servant comes to collect it, claims
that they are obliged to keep the matter secret, and offers to make the wife’s
temporary teaching job permanent in return for their co-operation. Enter next a neutrality campaigner seeking
evidence of the drone’s existence. He
explains that only Official Secrets Act signatories are bound by its
provisions; and also that Ireland is no longer genuinely neutral but is in a
‘Partnership for Peace’ with NATO, making its skies open to NATO aircraft. The husband agrees to appear in an internet
video on the subject. This brings the
civil servant back to tell them that the campaigner is an extreme nationalist
responsible for a racist attack upon a direct provision hostel. This, incidentally, is far from
plausible. While some ethno-cutural
nationalists do prize neutrality, they seldom campaign actively on the issue;
neutrality campaigners are generally pacifists using the subject to combat
militarism without reference to Irish national identity. The wife feels obliged to support her husband
publicly while urging him to break with the campaigner. Her character emerges as one calculated to
appeal to an educated, urban audience with liberal modern mores. The husband, on the other hand, for all that
they had come from the city, soon degenerates into something of a rustic
stereotype, enjoying manual labour and talking about neutrality as a key
element of national identity. The play
culminates in the wife’s declaring her sympathies with the Ukrainians whose
children she teaches, and claiming that as Ireland is entirely bound up with
the fortunes of the western world (NATO and the EU) it is not and should not
pretend to be neutral but should, in effect, go all in with its allies.
This was
propaganda with a purpose, and it came in the context of concerted efforts over
many years to overcome Ireland’s formal commitment to neutrality. To start with, it must be said that that
commitment is a good deal less definite than is generally imagined and that, in
practice, it has been greatly diminished in recent decades. The Constitution of Ireland is a curious
document full of contradictions and giving full play to the paradoxes of
political life in its balance between a variety of claims, interests, visions
and objectives with the intention of creating a secular state culturally
grounded in Catholic social teaching without actually saying so
explicitly. The word ‘neutrality’ does
not appear in it and neither does the concept.
What does appear there is a commitment to peace:
ARTICLE 29
1 Ireland affirms
its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations
founded on international justice and morality.
2 Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific
settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial
determination.
3 Ireland accepts the generally recognised
principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with
other States.
Countered by the vaguely worded grant to the State of a
capacity to act in concert with other nations that does not rule out military
activity:
4.2 For the purpose of the exercise of any executive function of the
State in or in connection with its external relations, the Government may to
such extent and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be determined by
law, avail of or adopt any organ, instrument, or method of procedure used or
adopted for the like purpose by the members of any group or league of nations
with which the State is or becomes associated for the purpose of international
co-operation in matters of common concern.
Indeed, this ability to adopt the methods of procedure
employed by any group or league of nations with which the State is associated,
was used as the legal basis for Irish participation in the suppression of
Katanga and in subsequent UN ‘peacekeeping’ operations some of which have also
involved active combat.
It is the
basis for membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme under which
non-members cooperate with NATO across as many of a wide range of operational
areas as they care to choose. Here it is
clear just how unclear – in the absence of any constitutional or other legal
definition – the concept of Irish neutrality really is. Although working closely with NATO which
appears to be one ‘side’ or ‘pole’ of a divided world – howsoever one might
care to demarcate the division – would appear to be a clear renunciation of any
neutrality policy that might have operated previously, governments of or led by
both major parties claim, and have claimed since joining up in 1999, that
Ireland operates within the Partnership for Peace framework, on the basis of
its military neutrality. It is possible
that such a claim might have been made in good faith in 1999 on the assumption
that the world after the Cold War was, and would remain, unipolar and that
Russia might take up the suggestion that it join NATO while Chinese membership
of the WTO led the PRC into a non-confrontational relationship with other
nations. Those ideas were certainly in
the air at the time, but they are not now.
Another
possibility is that America could be viewed as one side and Russia (or Russia
and China combined) as the other, and either everybody else or ‘Europe’ (the
European Union) in particular as the neutral third party. This idea belongs to a Gaullist concept of
the nature and destiny of Europe as a united continent led – and this is
unspoken but at the heart of the idea – by France and powered by Germany
working in a Carolingian union.
President Macron spoke in just such terms in November 2018 when
discussing a European army to defend against America, Russia and China without
explaining how such a force could be squared with membership of a defensive
alliance including America.
On this reading NATO
is not led by America as its funding model would suggest; it is, rather, a
union of European nations, the Western European Union, acting in partnership
with its transatlantic allies America and Canada. The WEU officially redefined itself in a 1991
declaration: “WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European
Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance”. Hence the Partnership for
Peace operates through the WEU and within the European Union context in which
Ireland generally conducts its international politics.
As part of
the negotiations leading to accession to the Treaty of Nice the Constitution
was amended to preclude (26th Amendment) Irish participation in what
the Treaty on European Union, referred to as a ‘common defence’ by which it
means its own armed forces with Circle of Stars cap badges.
Article 29.4.9 The State shall not adopt a
decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence pursuant
to Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union where that common defence would
include the State.
While the keenest of EUrophiles, the federalists, might well
want something of that sort as an integral element of national sovereignty
which the EU must have if it is ever to be recognisable as a country in its own
right, it is not in any way necessary that it exist in theory for the reality
of it to exist in fact. This external
ambiguity builds upon the ambivalence characteristic of Irish legal culture to
result in a situation under which Ireland’s commitment to peace stands
alongside commitments inexorably leading to military preparation and
cooperation with those actively engaged in warfare even if Irish troops stay at
home. Ireland actively participates in
every step intended to lead to the establishment of the ‘common defence’ as
described in the Treaty on European Union
Article 42. 1. The common security and defence policy shall be an
integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the
Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The
Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall
be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.
Article 42.2 The common security and defence policy shall include the
progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a
common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It
shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a
decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in accordance with
this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and
defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of
certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be
compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that
framework.
It shares in the common security and defence policy and, in
so far as it exists, the common Union defence policy, if not precisely as such
then through the Partnership for Peace.
Because the WEU has been effectively incorporated into the EU there is,
in practice, no distinction between acting on the basis of one or on that of
the other. The EU’s words about NATO in
Article 42.2 (above) and 42.7
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid
and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51
of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character
of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area
shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.
and in the official European Council notification on PESCO
A long-term vision of Pesco could be to arrive
at a coherent full spectrum force package – in complementarity with Nato, which
will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defence for its members.
can be understood only in that light. A Union action, even
one of a ‘common defence’, could equally be described as a NATO ‘coalition of
the willing’ in circles where that would be more acceptable e.g. in NATO
friendly but EUrosceptic nations. How
else could the British be persuaded to fall in behind the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy post-Brexit?Ireland joined the EU’s Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO) initiative under Article 42.6:
Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria
and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a
view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured
cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by
Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.
in 2017 and its military expenditure has grown by over 27% to
meet that commitment. Article 42.7
respects peace and neutrality policies at least in principle while not ruling
out a demand that obligations under the clause be fulfilled in some not
necessarily military manner; but PESCO is for volunteer nations willing to
participate in ‘European external action in the military field’ and Ireland has
joined up not been conscripted. In
January 2018 an Taoiseach told the European Parliament how broad Ireland’s
contribution to PESCO would be:
A Europe worth building is a
Europe worth defending. With the launch of PESCO in December, which Ireland was
pleased to join, we are coming together to deal with new threats in an
inclusive way. The threats we face in the 21st century include cyber terrorism,
cyber attacks, international terrorism, uncontrolled mass migration, natural
disasters, and drug and human trafficking. We want to be involved in European
actions against all of these.
Ireland also has a proud history
of military neutrality, participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, EU Common
Security Defence Policy Operations and non-membership of NATO. So, we will
participate in PESCO in ways consistent with those traditions.
‘Military neutrality’, ‘non-membership of NATO’ and the
constitutional prohibition on joining the as yet non-existent common defence
have little practical effect or meaning; Ireland conducts economic warfare
through the international sanctions regime; it refuels warships and military
aircraft; it provides battlefield medical and nursing services, using its new
Casa CE95 aircraft for evacuations from war zones; it provides
counter-terrorism training; it sent troops to Kosovo and to Afghanistan as part
of KFOR and ISAF; and has now, as of
September, signed up to provide intelligence and cybersecurity services. It would not, then, be a great change of
direction for Ireland to abandon any pretence that it is thoroughly militarised
and far from ‘neutral’ as many people now understand that word. To make such a declaration would, however,
open to public debate that which is customarily settled by private agreement,
allowing the possibility of a public rejection of the political class’
negotiations and even of the political class itself. The policy of ‘neutrality’ has always rested
exclusively on political declarations issued to meet the expediencies of a
passing moment and was only ever really intended to paper over the cracks
arising from the differences between nationalists in the degree to which they
recognised the realities of geography and sought either a cultural and
political separation from Britain, or else sought a fantasy of independence by
forming alliances with Britain’s enemies.
As a term of political art, it could mean anything or nothing depending
on the circumstances, but the word ‘neutrality’ secured peace between the
people of Ireland in Ireland itself, and might objectively be said to have
served its purpose in that. Its time, however, is not done yet as, while they
might debate ‘redefining’ it for ever, the politicians fear that, it having
been for so long a watchword for many believers in independence (however that
might be understood), dropping it might rally people to put all the sterile
debates of the past behind them and set out on a new path under new leadership. I fear that their fears are unrealistic.
This fear of
public debate, with a fear of the public itself behind it, is the hallmark of
politicians who wish to lead us where we do not wish to go. They want us to think we want it too, and to
take responsibility for it to escape being held responsible themselves; use of
the referendum under Art. 47 of the Constitution allows this in Ireland. Relentless EUrophile propaganda might
persuade Ireland and other EU nations to make a formal commitment to a federal
Union; but even if it does not, the reality of one will be created without
officially naming it as such just as the European Constitution rejected under
the referendum of 2001 on the proposed 24th amendment came back as
merely another Treaty and with some frightening words taken out for
incorporation into an Bunreacht under the 26th amendment the
following year, and just as the constitutional PESCO is none other than the
unconstitutional common defence wearing not even a different hat, just a
different badge on it. As pro-life campaigners know from old battles, Ireland’s
Supreme Court is neither, in the American parlance, ‘originalist’ nor
‘constructivist’ but merely literalist, so the verbal distinction makes all the
difference.
While absolute pacifists must be respected in the integrity
of their convictions, a nation cannot pursue a policy of pacifism in practice,
but what it can do is to limit its military commitments to those necessary to
defend its own interests without being drawn into wider alliances. A realistic assessment of Ireland’s defence
requirements would be that, firstly as an importing nation, Ireland must act in
concert with other countries to safeguard the freedom of the high seas with
freedom of passage and freedom of trade; and secondly, that Ireland must work
closely with the United Kingdom in the defence of our shared archipelago. The first is principally a diplomatic task
but might well involve naval activity against either state or non-state
parties. The second is largely fulfilled
already by Irish volunteers within the British armed forces, but formalised
defence and intelligence cooperation with an explicit territorial limitation is
highly desirable. On the strength of what I have already said, I must add that
the only way for Ireland to reject the big bloc alliances that lead inexorably
to war, and to fulfil the ‘international vocation in support of peace and
security’ to which the amendment seeking
to stall accession to the Partnership for Peace referred all those years ago
would be for Ireland to reject the European Union in favour of open and
peaceable relations with the world at large.
The Constitution with its ambiguities, verbal gymnastics, get
out clauses and general two facedness is unworthy of its preamble which should
be a constant inspiration to us all:
In the Name
of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final
end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,
We, the
people of Éire,
Humbly acknowledging all our
obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through
centuries of trial,
Gratefully
remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful
independence of our Nation,
And seeking
to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and
Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true
social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord
established with other nations,
Do hereby
adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.
Which should be a constant inspiration to us all.
When the election comes make your vote worthy of it and
reject the siren voices; remember your obligation to our Saviour; follow your
duty to promote the common good with due observance of prudence, justice and
charity; and observe your own calling to seek peace at home and abroad. In all your choices, electoral, social and
personal choose Christ. Vote only for candidates
who support Irexit as part of your commitment to peaceable relations between,
sovereign nations, and to the level of independence that should be the natural
concomitant of Ireland’s geographical, historical and cultural
circumstances.
By Prayer Crusader St Philip Howard
